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PREDICT AND SUSPECT: THE EMERGENCE OF ARTIFICIAL LEGAL
MEANING
Daniel Maggen*
Recent theoretical writings on the possibility that algorithms
would someday be able to create law have delayed algorithmic lawmaking—and the need to decide on its legitimacy—to some future
time in which algorithms would be able to replace human
lawmakers. This Article argues that such discussions risk
essentializing an anthropomorphic image of the algorithmic
lawmaker as a unified decision-maker and divert attention away
from algorithmic systems that are already performing functions
that, together, have a profound effect on legal implementation,
interpretation, and development. Adding to the rich scholarship of
the distortive effects of algorithmic systems, this Article suggests
that state-of-the-art algorithms capable of limited legal analysis can
have the effect of preventing legal development. Such algorithminduced ossification, this Article argues, raises questions of
legitimacy that are no less consequential than those raised by some
futuristic algorithms that can actively create norms.
To demonstrate this point, this Article puts forward a
hypothetical example of algorithms performing limited legal
analysis to assist healthcare professionals in reporting suspected
child maltreatment. Already in use are systems performing risk
analysis to aid child protective services in screening maltreatment
*
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reports. Drawing on the example of algorithms increasingly used
today in social media content moderation, this Article suggests that
similar systems could be used for flagging cases that show signs of
suspected abuse. Accordingly, such assistive systems, this Article
argues, will likely cement the prevailing legal meaning of
maltreatment. As mandated child-abuse reporters increasingly rely
on such systems, the result would be the absence of legal evolution,
inhibiting changes to contentious elements in the legal definition of
“reportable suspicion,” including, for example, the scope of
acceptable physical disciplining. Together with the familiar effect of
existing systems, the effect of this hypothetical algorithmic system
could have a profound impact on the path of the law regarding child
maltreatment, equivalent in its significance to the effect that
autonomous algorithmic adjudication would have.
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“The judges of normality are present everywhere.”1
I.
INTRODUCTION
Theorizing about the legal meaning of artificial intelligence
often involves thought experiments. Scholars want to keep ahead of
the curve lest society finds in retrospect that it surrendered its legal
fate to algorithmic overlords; being ready entails drawing on present
experiences in order to prepare for future developments before those
developments take place.2 However, projecting the legal debate to
some future time can have the adverse effect of obfuscating minute
contemporary development by stressing more apparent future
changes, so that by the time the hypothetical is made possible, the
debate will have already been concluded.
This problem often happens in the debate on the meaning of
decision-making algorithms in the legal realm. In a number of
influential pieces, Lawrence Solum and Eugene Volokh use thought
experiments to offer illuminating discussions on the legitimacy of
algorithmic norm-setting—meaning the use of computer systems to
autonomously produce, through legislation and adjudication, the
norms by which human beings live.3 Both Solum and Volokh
suggest that, in the non-immediate future, machine learning systems
will attain the functional capacity to create norms at a level that at
least matches human capabilities, and that, by virtue of their
computational superiority, society should favorably, or at least
seriously, consider substituting algorithmic for human norm1

MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 304 (Alan Sheridan trans.,
Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
2
See Lawrence B. Solum, Artificial Meaning, 89 WASH. L. REV. 69, 77 (2014).
3
See id.; Lawrence B. Solum, Artificially Intelligent Law, 1 BIOLAW J. 53
(2019); Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135 (2019).
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setting.4 Rather than ignore the myriad of reasons to resist
algorithmic law-making, these thought experiments are meant to
generate debate on the nature of law, legal interpretation, and
legitimacy.5 However, by postponing the discussion to a future time
when algorithms could replace humans as norm-setters, these
discussions can desensitize society to the fact that the effects Solum
and Volokh discuss are already taking place. As a society, humans
are on the cusp of a world affected by artificial legal meaning, and
any delay in deciding on its legitimacy can have lasting effects.
The thought experiments Solum and Volokh offer discuss the
rise of algorithmic law-making progress in three general stages. In
the first stage, which has already become a regular part of
contemporary legal reality, algorithmic systems perform auxiliary
functions that support human decision-making.6 In the second,
which is materializing before our eyes, these systems perform
assistive functions, comparable to those of human agents but subject
to human discretion with regard to the decision itself, particularly
with respect to matters of accountability.7 Finally, in the third step,8
algorithmic decision-making becomes autonomous, in the sense that
the system itself makes the normative decisions in question, with no
effective human involvement.9 Solum and Volokh concede that
progressing from the second to the third stage raises considerable
normative questions but argue that ultimately, no inherent reasons
exist to suggest that society avoid taking this step: the legitimacy of
4

See Solum, supra note 3, at 62.
See id. at 62; Solum, supra note 2, at 85; Volokh, supra note 3, at 1137.
6
See Solum, supra note 3, at 53–54; Volokh, supra note 3, at 1149. For a
discussion on the state of such systems, see infra Part IV.
7
See Solum, supra note 3, at 54. As discussed below, Volokh does not seem to
clearly distinguish between the first and second stages. Volokh, supra note 3, at
1154. For a discussion on such systems, see infra Part V(A).
8
This three-stage progression assumes that no additional step follows in which
these algorithm systems decide that an ideal normative world would involve
ridding the world of human beings. See NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE
140–54 (2014).
9
See Solum, supra note 2, at 75; Solum, supra note 3, at 54; Volokh, supra
note 3, at 1142.
5
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autonomous algorithmic law-making should depend solely on the
systems’ competencies relative to comparable human adjudicators.10
Setting aside the third step’s prudence and legitimacy, this
Article argues that the move from the second to the third stage is a
mirage; the normative implications of algorithmic decision-making
are already apparent in the combination of the first two stages. This
Article further suggests that delaying the time of scrutiny to the third
stage can be based on the thought that creating legal meaning
necessarily involves changing legal norms. However, it is now
patently clear: auxiliary algorithmic systems, such as those used to
provide legal decision-makers with risk predictions, have a
considerable effect on the meaning of the legal categories in which
those systems operate.11 Less noticed, however, has been the more
profound effect that assistive systems can have on legal
development by shaping the legal narratives made available to
decision-makers. For example, by determining which cases are
brought before human adjudicators, such assistive systems inversely
participate in law-making by hindering the law’s natural
development. Even though such systems do not (yet) generate novel
legal paradigms, relying on their assistance effectively means
ceding human control over legal development to these assistive
systems, limiting the law’s future course to those legal
classifications that informed the systems’ creation.
To demonstrate this point, this Article offers a thought
experiment of its own, involving the use of algorithmic systems that
assist in the mandated reporting of child maltreatment. Such systems
already operate in the auxiliary stage, aiding child protective
services to respond to complaints by predicting the level of risk
involved.12 The thought experiment suggests taking such systems to
the next level by designing machine learning systems to assist
mandated reporters in determining which cases give rise to
“reportable suspicion”—meaning a suspicion of child abuse that is

10

See Solum, supra note 3, at 62; Volokh, supra note 3, at 1138.
See infra Part IV.
12
See infra Part VI(B).
11
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sufficiently probable, involves serious harm, and does not fall under
the acceptable physical disciplining exception, as discussed below.
This Article suggests that, even in the assistive stage (the second
stage), algorithmic systems can produce legal meaning by
preventing the natural development of reportable maltreatment’s
meaning. Algorithmic systems have this effect by constricting
reporters’ decisions to those that meet the algorithm’s definition of
maltreatment, which is in turn tied to the legal paradigms that
informed the algorithm’s training process. By insulating the
meaning of “maltreatment” from social changes, such as those
concerning the legal implications of physical disciplining, these
algorithmic legal decision-making systems effectively determine
the path of law.
II. THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS
Until not so long ago, the idea of artificially intelligent
adjudication was invoked mainly as a thought exercise to tell
something about the nature of legal adjudication and its connection
to human agency.13 In recent years, as computer software has
become progressively better at emulating human decision-making,
legal scholarship has shifted to seriously discuss the legitimacy of
using adjudicative algorithms.14 Still, since contemporary
technology is quite far from producing algorithms capable of
comprehensive legal analysis, any talk of judicial algorithms
remains hypothetical. Nevertheless, as opposed to past creative
exercises’ discussion of artificial adjudication, today’s thought
experiments are meant to lay the groundwork for the possibility that,
someday soon, computers will be capable of successfully emulating
13

See Joshua P. Davis, Law Without Mind: AI, Ethics, and Jurisprudence, 55
CAL. W. L. REV. 165, 181 (2018); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for
Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Of
Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 18 PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY
WORKING PAPERS 1, 1–4 (2001).
14
See Davis, supra note 13, at 171–72; Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Stephen E.
Henderson, Artificial Intelligence and Role-Reversible Judgment, 109 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 137, 143 (2019).
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humans’ ability to pass judgment. A successful contemporary
thought exercise, therefore, will not only teach something about the
law, but will also help the legal community anticipate this potential
artificial development.15
Unfortunately, these thought experiments’ futuristic perspective
can also prepare the legal community for the wrong thing; as debate
ensues in preparation for the rise of robo-judges, scholars and
commentators can become oblivious to the fact that, for all intents
and purposes, algorithms have already taken the helm of
adjudication. Such mental preparations are analogous to preparing
society for the age of vacuuming robots and leaving it unmindful to
the reality in which algorithms have taken over the task of
vacuuming by inhabiting the vacuum cleaner itself. In other words,
just like the mental image of an android using a manual vacuum
cleaner, thought experiments that fixate on the judicial decisionmaker’s agency, discretion, and creativity risk essentializing the
image of the autonomous, norm-generating judge or justice. All the
while, this fixation neglects the fact that adjudication can involve
discrete functions, and that these functions can effectively, if not
essentially, be taken over by computer algorithms without some
attention-grabbing judicial usurpation. To prepare for such a
creeping takeover, the legal community must focus its attention not
on the future development of judicial software, but on what
algorithms are already doing now, as these algorithms slowly but
steadily shape increasing portions of the legal landscape in their
image.
A. The Three-Pronged Hypothetical
The thought experiments Solum and Volokh present offer
insightful discussions that illuminate the nature of artificial
adjudication but, at the same time, also risk obscuring the exigency
of the discussions. Any attempt to briefly survey these beautifully
crafted hypotheticals would do them terrible wrong; still, it can be
generally said that despite their differences, the two models offered
in this Article follow the progression of legally-minded algorithms
15

Solum, supra note 3, at 62; Volokh, supra note 3, at 1138.
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from (1) systems that have been in use for some time now, to (2)
emerging and near-future use cases based on state-of-the-art
machine learning technology, and lastly, (3) to hypothetical future
usages based on not-yet-existing technology. The first two stages of
this progression can be described as tracking legal algorithms from
auxiliary systems that operate in the service of broader legal tasks
to assistive systems that aid legal decision-makers in adjudication
by offering limited forms of legal analysis.16 The latter systems,
actual or hypothetical, are capable of some form of legal reasoning
but lack the ability to see the big picture, which is an essential part
of any legal analysis. The thought experiments in this Article,
however, focus their attention on the third stage, involving
autonomous adjudicative systems, animated by still nonexistent
technology.17
In these scenarios, the algorithm’s advancement from the
auxiliary to the assistive stage is incremental, following the
quantitative evolution of its capabilities.18 Although the human
decision-maker increasingly relies on the software’s assistance, the
final say remains in human hands.19 In contrast, the move from the
second to the third stage in these scenarios is abrupt, highly visible,
and immediately consequential, occurring the moment that human
decision-makers are taken out of the picture and the algorithms take
full control of the process.20 Volokh describes this move as the “AI
promotion,”21 suggesting that it would be a “startling step,” but one
worth taking.22 In a similar vein, Solum writes that taking this step
“would surely be controversial” and would raise considerable
questions of legitimacy.23

16

Volokh, supra note 3, at 1149.
See Solum, supra note 2, at 85; Solum, supra note 3, at 55; id. at 1137, 1146–47.
18
See Solum, supra note 3, at 54; Volokh, supra note 3, at 1146–47.
19
See Solum, supra note 3, at 53–54.
20
See id. at 54; Solum, supra note 2, at 74.
21
See Volokh, supra note 3, at 1142, 1156–77.
22
See id. at 1142–43.
23
Solum, supra note 3, at 58–59.
17
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Both discussions intend to draw attention to the impending rise
of algorithmic adjudication and greet this rise with a calculated,
pragmatic approach.24 This past-present-future structure has the
effect of erroneously affording the discussion surrounding the
legitimacy of this consequential shift ample time to assess its
implications and relative worth. In truth, the time for deliberation is
now, as the discrete functions discussed can come together in
piecemeal and have an effect that is comparable to that of the third
stage, even in the absence of some clear artificial entity capable of
displacing human operators in toto. The remainder of this Article
seeks to illustrate this point by offering a thought experiment that
takes place in the second stage, demonstrating that even assistive
systems can reach effective law-making status.
B. Artificial Lawmaking Now
In focusing on the disruptiveness and legitimacy of the third,
adjudicative stage of legal algorithm’s development, Solum and
Volokh’s thought experiments make two implicit assumptions that
the thought experiment discussed in this Article questions. The first
assumption is that the progress from the first, auxiliary stage to the
second, assistive stage is mainly quantitative, naturally occurring as
the algorithm becomes progressively better at what it does and is
thus accorded greater responsibility. This notion of incremental
progress conceals the fact that the pattern of development
algorithms have followed from the past to the present involves not
just greater accuracy but also a qualitative leap, as algorithms
progressed from systems only capable of offering factual analysis to
enhanced systems that can emulate normative decision-making,
albeit limited in breadth.25 Focusing on the hypothetical, highlyvisible step of replacing humans with algorithmic decision-makers
can overshadow this less visible but just as consequential shift from
merely factual to normative algorithms. If this shift is indeed the
case, then asking whether algorithmic takeover is legitimate is
24

See Solum, supra note 2, at 85; id. at 55, 58; Volokh, supra note 3, at 1137.
See infra Part V. Volokh also introduces this distinction, although he seems
to identify both factual and legal analysis in which algorithms are capable of
performing robust legal functions. See Volokh, supra note 3, at 1154–56.
25
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beside the point; instead, what needs to be asked is whether the
effects of normative algorithms on legal decision-making are
congruent with legitimate law-making.
Second, and relatedly, these hypotheticals assume that the
change symbolizing the rise of algorithmic adjudicators involves
algorithms acquiring some essential quality that is synonymous with
adjudication qua the creation of legal meaning. For Solum, this
transformative step entails that the algorithm exhibits three qualities:
(1) the ability to generate legal norms, (2) the ability to apply the
norms generated, and (3) the ability to modify those norms in
response to varying factual conditions.26 Volokh likewise sees normcreation as the quintessential quality of adjudication, although
Volokh suggests that this quality can be measured according to the
algorithm’s ability to create persuasive legal arguments.27 As a
result, and unlike Solum, Volokh includes in the third stage, not just
the image of the algorithmic law-maker, but also the image of the
algorithmic attorney—both involving a meaningful sense of judicial
agency and are thus equally futuristic.28 Despite this difference, for
both authors, the real normative discussion begins when algorithms
acquire some distinct capability that captures the essence of
adjudication.
The thought experiment below opposes these two assumptions
by suggesting that existing or near-future systems that are still in the
assistive stage have already largely acquired the capacities that put
the systems in a position to effectively create legal meaning.
Computer algorithms are already extensively used to produce firststage auxiliary systems, aiding decision-makers in making legal
decisions by providing them with relevant factual information.29
Likewise, social media platforms today extensively employ machine
learning algorithms in second-stage assistive functions to flag
prohibited materials for further human scrutiny—at times basing
26

See Solum, supra note 2, at 75; Solum, supra note 3, at 57.
See Volokh, supra note 3, at 1182–84.
28
See id. at 1146–47.
29
See infra Part IV.
27
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their determinations on legal classifications, such as non-consent
and terrorism.30 This Article’s thought experiment examines the
possibility that similar technologies will be used in the near future
to assist healthcare mandated reporters in determining whether their
patients’ cases mandate reporting. Additionally, this Article
suggests that reporters’ probable use of such systems will likely
make the reporters reliant on the system’s judgment to determine
which cases should undergo further scrutiny. As the thought
experiment demonstrates, the growing reliance on algorithmic
systems can have minute and unfelt influences, accumulating into a
systemic effect that can fulfill the conditions that Solum suggests
are the marks of law-making; as the algorithms transform the
meaning of existing norms, determine these norms’ implementation,
and (inversely) affect the course of legal development. Although
little differentiates this hypothetical system from the one already in
use in social media, the proposed example more clearly illustrates
the effects such systems can have on the development of artificial
legal meaning.
III. LEGAL TECHNOLOGIES
Although the age of robotic judges is still far off, the legal
domain is already accustomed to the use of “artificial intelligence,”
meaning computer systems capable of performing tasks that would
be indicative of intelligence when performed by human beings.31
Unlike the anticipated—and feared—artificial general intelligence,
contemporary artificially intelligent systems perform very specific
functions in limited settings and to narrowly defined effects.
Accordingly, any discussion of such systems must be firmly rooted
30

See DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM:
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 19 (2020);
David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn
About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 676 (2017); Daniel Maggen,
Law In, Law Out: Legalistic Filter Bubbles and the Algorithmic Prevention of
Nonconsensual Pornography, 43 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
31
TOSHINORI MUNAKATA, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE NEW ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 1 (David Gries & Fred B. Schneider eds., 2d ed. 2008). But see
NILS J. NILSSON, THE QUEST FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 483 (2010).
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in the specific tasks the systems perform and how the systems are
designed to perform those tasks, as well as in the general
environment that shapes the systems’ design and operation. Even
though it is unnecessary to know the exact details of either of those
conditions, the general principles that animate artificially intelligent
systems and their basic premises set the limits for these systems’ use
cases and determine the dynamics such systems impose on those
who use them.
A. Traditional Algorithms
Until somewhat recently, legal algorithms, and artificial
intelligence more generally, relied almost exclusively on manuallycreated algorithms.32 Crafting such algorithms was primarily an
exercise in formal logic representation that involved creating models
of the desired tasks and transforming the tasks into programmable
if-then-else rules.33 A familiar example of manually-created
algorithms are “expert systems”: computer algorithms that
transform subject-matter expertise into formal-logic models put into
a user-friendly computer software.34 Creating such systems is as
much a product of subject-matter expertise as it is of coding; unlike
machine learning’s automated pattern-seeking approach, expert
systems heavily rely on human know-how to painstakingly shoehorn
knowledge into precise rules and definitions.35
An expert system that has been the focus of considerable
scholarly interest is one that leverages statistical expertise to
produce algorithms capable of offering risk predictions.36 With the
advent of the age of “big data,” statistics have shown great promise
32

See Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal
Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 29, 48, 50–51 (2019).
33
See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and
Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 688 (2010).
34
STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE A MODERN
APPROACH 22–24 (Stuart Russell & Peter Norvig eds., 4th ed. 2021).
35
See Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1305, 1317 (2019).
36
See Ric Simmons, Big Data, Machine Judges, and the Legitimacy of the
Criminal Justice System, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1067, 1072–74 (2018).
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in plotting correlations with impressive precision, at times obviating
the need to explain the causal connection between reasons and
consequences.37 With sufficient data, regression analysis can, for
instance, be used to demonstrate the useful connection between
different independent variables and a dependent variable that
presumably ensues from the independent variables, even when the
connection is inexplicable.38 Statistical analysis has thus been used
to quantify the relation between various criminogenic variables—
factors that experts identify as associated with crime—and the
occurrence of criminal acts, ostensibly demonstrating the
probability of crime taking place whenever a set of indicators is
observed.39 The statistical model that maps the probabilistic
connection between the indicators and the occurrence of crime can
then be translated into an algorithm that provides a “risk score” for
any given case.40 In other words, the heavy lifting in risk-prediction
expert systems is done by the statistical analysis, and transforming
the statistically-produced models into algorithms that animate userfriendly software can provide legal decision-makers with a
“mechanical statistician” to be used whenever a legal need arises.
The use of expert systems of this sort has become most dominant
in bail decisions,41 sentencing,42 and “predictive policing”—a
technology that has helped law enforcement agencies manage their

37

VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 50–72
(2013).
38
Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Prediction, Persuasion, and the
Jurisprudence of Behaviorism, 68 U. TORONTO L.J. 63, 73 (2018).
39
For discussions of the mechanism of risk prediction, see Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
327, 370 (2015); see also Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion:
Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 16
(2016); Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms,
and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 877 (2016).
40
See Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 509 (2017).
41
See John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment
and the Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1757–65 (2018).
42
See Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 69–
72 (2017).
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limited surveillance resources more efficiently.43 Although these
applications, increasingly being implemented in all jurisdictions,44
do not directly replace human discretion, these expert systems are
nonetheless viewed as revolutionary police force multipliers that
greatly expand law enforcement agencies’ reach and formalize
adjudication.45 Some see this increased implementation as a
generally welcome development;46 however, others highlight its
pitfalls and the need to develop appropriate frameworks of
accountability and oversight in order to meet this expansion of the
states’ powers.47
Despite the widespread adoption of risk-prediction systems,
legal expert systems never really gained traction and are generally
falling out of style.48 Using formal logic to represent subject-matter
expertise can be a formidable task, both difficult and expensive.
Furthermore, expert-produced models are inherently limited in their
ability to produce actionable legal insight.49 For example, a law
enforcement professional’s ability to observe a situation and
determine whether it is “suspicious” involves the intuitive weighing
of numerous considerations—an intricate process that can hardly be
translated into straightforward, or even complex, logic-based rules.50
Although legal and other professional decisions often follow general
principles that can (at least in theory) be modeled by subject-matter
experts and transformed into logic-based algorithms, any significant

43

For discussions of predictive policing, see ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 30,
at 17; Simmons, supra note 36, at 1069–70.
44
See Simmons, supra note 36, at 1072.
45
See Joh, supra note 39, at 19.
46
See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative
Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1161 (2017)
(noting the growing usage of algorithms in the legal context).
47
See Simmons, supra note 36, at 1075–77.
48
See Pasquale, supra note 32, at 48.
49
See Surden, supra note 35, at 1309.
50
See Jason Millar & Ian Kerr, Delegation, Relinquishment, and
Responsibility: The Prospect of Expert Robots, in ROBOT L. 102 (Ryan Calo et al.
eds., 2015).
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attempt to even come close to capturing the essence of legal
judgment in this way would inevitably grow to gargantuan size.51
B. Machine Learning Algorithms
As computer scientists pushed forward in the quest for humanlevel functionality, the solution to this seemingly insurmountable
challenge came from a shift to machine learning.52 Without
needlessly going into details beyond those that will be of use below,
the difference between machine learning and logic-based, manuallycreated algorithms can be illustrated by the attempt to model human
language.53 Early efforts in natural language processing, based on
the manual transformation of linguistic rules of syntax and grammar
into formal instructions, were initially successful in “teaching”
computers to understand language from the inside, so to speak.54
However, as has quickly become evident, any practical use of such
top-down systems would involve, not only the immense task of
modeling the complex structures that create natural languages, but
also representing in formal terms the vast amounts of worldly
knowledge any ordinary use of language relies upon.55 While some
researchers still soldier on,56 most have shifted from meticulously
modeling language and representing knowledge, to devising
methods for algorithms to automatically discern patterns of
language usage from provided examples, often guided by linguistic
expertise.57 Machine learning did away with the need to represent
human knowledge manually, instead focusing on the “datafied”
expressions of any form of knowledge to create algorithms that can

51

This challenge has become most evident in the field of natural language
processing, essential for legal analysis. See NILSSON, supra note 31, at 103–21.
52
See id. at 398–425.
53
See id. at 431.
54
See id. at 103–21.
55
See id. at 354–61.
56
A notable example is the Cyc knowledge representation platform. See
CYCORP, https://www.cyc.com [https://perma.cc/48YY-6AL2].
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See NILSSON, supra note 31, at 431–36.
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emulate knowledge-based decisions by observing the patterns past
decisions have left in their wake.58
Like more traditional forms of data mining, machine learning is
reliant on bifurcated datasets of input and output data: the output
data being the end result of the sought-after function and the input
data standing for more or less everything else in the datasets.59 In the
oft-used example of spam classification, the datasets include past
spam classifications as the output data and all other information
about the emails as the input data.60 Deciding what data to use as
output data is therefore synonymous with determining the essence
of the algorithm.61
Once the training set is prepared, machine learning stands for
various methods of learning from the datasets the relationship
between the input and output data.62 The learning algorithm is
iteratively “trained” on a dataset—each iteration bringing the
algorithm closer to creating a new algorithm that best represents a
process or “function” that produced patterns in the data.63 Like the
process used by expert statisticians, a machine learning algorithm is
meant to model the connection between the independent and
dependent variables in the training set.64 In supervised learning, the
learning algorithm primarily creates this model by starting from
relatively random configurations of the input/output relationship
and measuring each configuration’s fitness, meaning its congruence
with this relationship in the training data.65 Measuring each
iteration’s fitness and bringing that measurement to bear on the
emerging model—a process commonly referred to as minimizing its
58

See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 47, at 1167; MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER &
CUKIER, supra note 37, at 171–200.
59
See JOHN D. KELLEHER, DEEP LEARNING 26 (2019); Lehr & Ohm, supra note
30, at 677.
60
See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 91 (2014).
61
See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 30, at 673–74.
62
See KELLEHER, supra note 59, at 185–230.
63
See id. at 6–12.
64
See Pasquale & Cashwell, supra note 38, at 73.
65
See id. at 13; Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide
to Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 28 (2017).
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“objective function”—is the crux of supervised machine learning,
making the original output variable used in the datasets the
immutable touchstone of everything the ensuing algorithm could
possibly do in the future.66 Absent designer intervention, nothing
irreducible to the original output variable—the legal classification
in this Article’s hypothetical case—would be of meaning to the
resulting algorithm.67
The main difference between the two approaches, apart from
speed and efficiency, is that machine learning, especially in its
advanced forms, is not restricted to modeling a relatively limited and
predetermined number of variables, or “features,” connected
through the sought-after “function” to the dependent variable.68
Machine learning can, for instance, theoretically analyze a training
set in its entirety to create a holistic model of criminality (at least as
far as criminality is represented in the data), connecting the
occurrence of criminal behavior and every bit of information that
correlates to it.69 Although the effort to conserve computational
resources and avoid “overfitting” the data commonly leads
designers to reduce the number of features modeled by the learning
algorithm, the algorithm can nonetheless far surpass human efforts
by creating “hyper-dimensional” models out of a large number of
features, including variables that would not intuitively strike experts
as relevant.70 Furthermore, state-of-the-art machine learning
methods, especially those that involve deep learning, include stages
of mathematical abstraction that can effectively extract from the
training set implicit features that are irreducible to semantic
meaning.71
66

See KELLEHER, supra note 59, at 21–22.
See Alexander Campolo & Kate Crawford, Enchanted Determinism: Power
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1, 10–12 (2020).
68
See ETHEM ALPAYDIN, INTRODUCTION TO MACHINE LEARNING 2 (3d ed. 2014).
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and avoid overfitting. See IAN GOODFELLOW ET AL., DEEP LEARNING 417 (2016).
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See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 34, at 751–54.
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These “deep learning” abilities have made possible the creation
of algorithms that can successfully model human capabilities even
in areas dominated by human intuition and imagination that not long
ago were considered impervious to computer emulation.72 Provided
a sufficiently large number of labeled examples, supervised learning
has proven to be surprisingly apt at emulating such tasks, not only
replacing logic-based systems, but also far outpacing them.73 Thus,
using the large multilanguage depository of digitized books at its
disposal, Google, a leader in the field of machine learning, was
capable of producing surprisingly reasonable automatic translations,
a task that seemed almost unimaginable not long ago: Google
trained its algorithms to discern patterns from parallel passages
found in books published in different languages.74 In other cases,
“unsupervised machine learning” (a group of methods used to train
algorithms on unlabeled examples) and “reinforcement learning” (a
group of methods that uses positive or negative feedback to direct
the learning process) have proved even more remarkable by virtue
of their ability to go beyond the constraints of human labeling.75
These advancements allow machine learning to take on the
previously unimaginable task of emulating genuine legal analysis—

72

The most striking recent example comes from GPT-3, the latest natural
language processing algorithm, used to write entries for the New York Times’
Modern Love section. See Cade Metz, When A.I. Falls in Love, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/24/science/artificial-intelligencegpt3-writing-love.html [https://perma.cc/FKF6-JHLR].
73
Data scientists use various methods to come up with labeled datasets. See
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W. Silverman & M. C. Jones, E. Fix and J.L. Hodges (1951): An Important
Contribution to Nonparametric Discriminant Analysis and Density Estimation,
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deducing missing labels); Kate Crawford & Vladan Joler, Anatomy of an AI
System, A.I. NOW INST. & SHARE LAB (2018), https://anatomyof.ai
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at least to some level.76 Legal decisions, like determining whether
something constitutes reportable suspicion, are exercises in openended and subtle classification. The intuitive determinations that lie
at the heart of such judgment cannot be reduced to a small number
of logic-based rules or the interaction between a limited number of
variables.77 Unlike traditional algorithms, advanced machine
learning methods have proven surprisingly adept at emulating
intricate human abilities by extracting from relevant datasets the
kind of intuitive meanings and connections that cannot be expressed
by formal, articulable rules.78 This novel skill does not, however,
mean that the road is open for full-blown algorithmic legal analysis.
Genuine adjudication entails not just correctly implementing legal
rules but also intimate knowledge of the legal domain and a keen
understanding of the environment in which the decision is made,
components that cannot be easily extracted from legal databases.79
C. Big Data
The evolution of machine learning goes hand in hand with the
rise of big data. Machine learning has existed since the middle of the
previous century, with various methods being used to automatically
express data patterns as algorithms.80 However, initial advances in
the field were short-lived because, for this ability to be useful,
machine learning must rely on large quantities of relevant,
accessible, and analyzable data.81 The falling costs of data storage
76

See Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51
U.C. Davis L. REV. 399, 405 (2017); Danielle Ensign et al., Runaway Feedback
Loops in Predictive Policing, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 1, 1 (2018);
Surden, supra note 60, at 94.
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See Hani Nouman & Ravit Alfandari, Identifying Children Suspected for
Maltreatment: The Assessment Process Taken by Healthcare Professionals
Working in Community Healthcare Services, 113 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV.
1, 2 (2020).
78
See id. at 6; Lehr & Ohm, supra note 30, at 678 (discussing convolutional
neural networks).
79
See id.; Volokh, supra note 3, at 1159.
80
See generally PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM (2015)
(discussing the dominant approaches to machine learning).
81
See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 47, at 1164–65; Lehr & Ohm, supra note
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and computation, as well as advancements in data analysis and
learning methods, have transformed machine learning and other
forms of statistical analysis into primary ways of gleaning
knowledge directly from data, potentially disposing of the need to
acquire insights from meticulous theorizing and expertise.82
These developments have altered the purpose for which
algorithms are used from mainly modeling established connections
between independent and dependent variables—say, the numerical
relation between an applicant’s income and the risk of loan default,
to use a familiar example—to uncovering previously unknown
patterns representing insights hidden in the data.83 The ability to
model the subterranean forces and hidden influences buried in the
data has led to the development of “data mining”: the practice of
using data obtained for one purpose (or even without a purpose, such
as collecting the “data exhaust” individuals passively emit) to reveal
meaningful, even intimate, insights into the phenomena manifest in
the data.84 Data has thus become a resource, both valuable and
endlessly exploitable; once information undergoes datafication,
making it suitable intake for big data algorithms, the produced data
can be endlessly reused and repurposed, even for previously
unanticipated uses.85 Although datafication can provide immense
benefits, these developments also produce numerous deleterious
effects.86
In turn, the ballooning of data necessitates the use of algorithms
to keep data under control. Big data, in this sense, underlies both the
82
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need for automated screening to make data manageable and also the
technology that responds to this need by putting in place algorithmic
gatekeepers.87 The availability of big data creates an opportunity that
soon becomes a necessity: its vastness buttresses the ability to shift
from understanding complex processes to modeling them—
immediately opening the floodgates to a sea of precious knowledge
that can be handled only by embracing this paradigm shift and
adopting its products.88 The advent of big data thus puts machine
learning algorithms in a position to determine what information is
seen by human users, creating a sizable winnowing effect on what
data passes through the algorithmic gatekeepers and into human
hands.89 Often, the sheer scale of data makes unassisted human
decisions impossible; and many times, the breadth of data is itself
the product of algorithms.90 The massive amounts of data gathered
on social media, for instance, are largely the result of the algorithms
that control their conveyance: without algorithms to search, analyze,
and use these data, this information would not be publicly
available.91 The data on YouTube’s servers, for instance, is “big” by
virtue of its enormous size, but YouTube would not have swollen to
this size without the algorithms that facilitate the matchmaking
between videos and viewers.92
At other times, big data facilitates the creation of machine
learning algorithms that make assisted decision-making a costeffective alternative to unmediated human decisions. Even when a
task does not involve handling massive amounts of data, such as the
screening of patient information, the use of machine learning
algorithms can free time and resources that can be of better use in
making the clinical decision itself, making algorithms appear to be
87
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REV. 181, 185 (2017).
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attractive alternatives to human labor. And in yet another category
of cases, which will mainly be left out of this Article’s discussion,
the relevant data are themselves the products of algorithms.
Algorithms can, for instance, be proactively used to “mine” publicly
available data, video surveillance, and even commercially available
data exhaust, moving from a stance of passively monitoring freely
provided information to proactive surveillance in search of
actionable data.93 In either of these use cases and for these different
reasons, algorithms can come to dominate the data stream by
determining what information merits human attention.94 Even when
the target data are available for manual inspection, they can become
“subconscious” knowledge negotiated by an algorithmic superego.95
IV. AUXILIARY SYSTEMS AND THE MEANING OF THE NORM
In the three-prong framework offered by Solum and Volokh, the
first stage, that of auxiliary legal systems, is far from hypothetical.
Algorithms embedded in various measurement and analysis devices
have long informed legal decisions.96 Legal decisions are often
grounded in empirical data that are increasingly the products of
algorithms, from biological, physical, and chemical analysis to
facial recognition and other advanced forms of data collection and
processing.97
Advanced and transformative as these usages may be, the
algorithms that animate these usages can appear to be inert tools,
with only minor substantive legal effects.98 Nevertheless, the
profound effects that even such auxiliary algorithmic systems can
have on the implementation and interpretation of a legal norm have
93

See, e.g., Calo, supra note 76, at 421; Desai & Kroll, supra note 65, at 50–
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become familiar themes in legal scholarship.99 Although these
systems are incapable of actively engaging with the law’s normative
meaning, hidden biases and invisible design choices can nonetheless
affect the legal norm’s practical meaning by determining the
enforcement patterns of private and public agents.100
A. Implementation and Distortion
As many legal scholars note, algorithms are prone to producing
skewed factual findings, leading to biased applications of legal
norms.101 Such distortions can result either from inaccurate
specifications, meaning the incorrect translation of the legal task
into the specific requirement defining the algorithm’s function, or
from the faulty implementation of specifications in the algorithm’s
design.102 The gap between the abstract legal norm, the system’s
express specifications, and the algorithm’s implementation of either
is filled with design choices that are fertile ground for distortions

99
See Ben Green & Yiling Chen, Algorithmic Risk Assessments Can Alter
Human Decision-Making Processes in High-Stakes Government Contexts, 5
PROC. ACM HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION, 418:1, 418:1 (2021); Lehr & Ohm,
supra note 30, at 678; Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 89, at 185; Joshua A. Kroll
et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 633 (2017); Roth, supra
note 96, at 2021–22; Surden, supra note 60, at 101; Surden, supra note 35.
100
For discussion of legal algorithms in general, see Coglianese & Lehr, supra
note 47, at 1170; ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 30, at 16, 22; Perel & Elkin-Koren,
supra note 89, at 183. For discussion of algorithm use by state agencies, see, e.g.,
RASHIDA RICHARDSON ET AL., LITIGATING ALGORITHMS 2019 US REPORT: NEW
CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENT USE OF ALGORITHMIC DECISION SYSTEMS (2019);
Joh, supra note 39; Rich, supra note 39; Rashida Richardson et al., Dirty Data,
Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive
Policing Systems, and Justice, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 15 (2019).
101
For examples of this focus on accuracy, see, e.g., Bamberger, supra note 33,
at 676; Calo, supra note 76, at 415.
102
See Sebastian Benthall & Bruce D. Haynes, Racial Categories in Machine
Learning, in 2019 PROCEEDING OF THE CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS,
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Kenneth A. Bamberger, Saving Governance-by-Design, 106 CAL. L. REV. 697,
718 (2018).
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and biases that can widen the distance between the law on the books
and how the law is applied.103
Different stages in the design and operation of machine learning
algorithms can give rise to different distortions of a legal norm.
Machine learning can be separated into two broad stages: the
creation of the algorithm and the operation of the algorithm.104
Although some machine learning technologies are designed to work
“online,” thereby retraining the algorithm as it operates,105 the kind
of work that commonly goes into preparing datasets often entails, at
the very least, retraining that is performed on batches of new data.106
This limitation is particularly true for legal algorithms as they
commonly require a rigorous stage of preparation, often involving
the extensive use of subject-matter expertise.107
The first steps in creating a legal algorithm involve translating
the desired legal task into sufficiently exact specifications and the
subsequent transformation of those specifications, either manually
or through machine learning, into a programmable algorithm that
can then be turned into user-friendly software.108 This stepped
transformation from law to software can give rise to various
mistranslations, distorting the original meaning of the legal task, so
that even when the algorithm works as specified, it fails to meet the
requirements assumed by the relevant legal norm.109 Oftentimes, the
translation from norm to code and the specifications that control the
translation are constrained by cost-effectiveness and the availability
of relevant data.110 As Deirdre Mulligan and Kenneth Bamberger
demonstrate, these design decisions, as well as choices of method,
103
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1085, 1125 (2018).
104
See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 30, at 655.
105
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media, and formulations, are rarely value-neutral and are further
compounded by designers’ cognitive biases.111 These biases,
Bamberger notes, are prone to skewing the ensuing algorithm’s
results, creating a mismatch with its original legal purpose.112 A
compelling example that Bamberger provides concerns risk
prediction. As Bamberger suggests, translating legal risk
determinations into risk-predicting algorithms involves the inherent
danger of privileging measurable and quantifiable data and
specifications with the result of downplaying the importance of
information that is not easily quantified.113 This bias, Bamberger
warns, can, in turn, come to mean that implementation of the norm
misrepresents the kinds of risks it is meant to address.114
Such distortions can also abound in the learning process itself,
as training data that supposedly hold the key to the desired legal
function are fed into a learning algorithm meant to extract this
function. Training can fail to produce a representative model of the
desired legal function, either due to problems with the training set’s
predictiveness or because of a failure to accurately extract the
function from the data. When speaking of the first category of
failures, many often remark that machine learning can only be as
good as the data.115 The adage “garbage in, garbage out” has come
to represent the fact that machine learning is basically a way of
modeling datasets, so any problem in the datasets is bound to be
reflected in the ensuing algorithm.116 At times, such problems
concern datasets that do not include enough valuable information.
The data in the training sets are meant to serve the learning
algorithm as a gateway to the “ground truth” about the world, with
every dataset adding more information accordingly.117 Machine
learning is generally contingent on the availability of “big data”—
111
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often, smaller datasets mean a less accurate algorithm.118 However,
the datapoints also need to be pertinent to the desired task, meaning
that the datapoints are capable of establishing a connection between
relevant features and the desired outcome. Too little data that
establishes this connection would usually result in an insufficiently
precise algorithm that exhibits too much variance in its predictions
to be of use, sending designers back to the drawing board.119
Too much variance, however, is not the worst problem that bad
data can cause, as criticisms of the “bias in, bias out” type
demonstrate.120 As many scholars note, the law has been historically
biased against minorities due to pervasive bigotry and more nuanced
structural inequalities.121 As a result, the historical databases used to
create legal algorithms are steeped in discrimination and thus
produce factual findings that result in the biased application of the
legal norm.122
Beyond the imitation of inherent bias, distorted algorithms can
result from inadequate training data. Using the typical example of
credit scoring, an algorithm can be trained on a dataset that includes
a large number of past loan applications but relatively few minority
applicants, making ensuing predictions less accurate for future
minority applicants.123 More often, however, such problems are
illustrative of a more profound failure of predictiveness. The dataset
on which the algorithm trains is supposed to be a useful proxy for
the environment with which the algorithm is meant to engage,
capturing some “concepts” that express the underlying ground
truth.124 The concept of “default risk,” for instance, can be ill118
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captured by a dataset that misrepresents its spread in the real
world.125 Thus, a dataset that includes only those applicants granted
a loan can fail to adequately capture this concept—such as when it
fails to include a representative number of minority applicants and
therefore produces an algorithm that erroneously assigns minority
applicants a high risk value.126 Problems of concept can skirt the line
between bug and feature. Training an algorithm on a dataset
comprising of past decisions by bank officers will produce an
algorithm that mimics bankers; this outcome may or may not be
what the algorithm is intended to do.127 If the algorithm is meant to
rank insolvency risk as an abstract function, any biases that bank
officers commonly display will taint the data, resulting in an
algorithm that is similarly erroneous in performing this function.128
If, in contrast, the purpose of the algorithm is to mimic human
behavior, warts and all—for example, an algorithm used to predict
judicial decisions—such distortions will be features of its operation
rather than bugs.129 Often the problem is that available data pushes
the concept in the direction of mimicking behavior, making it
difficult to weed out biases or even categorize them as errors.130
Conceptual problems can be particularly daunting since they can
prove difficult to spot. The gold standard for evaluating an algorithm
is to test it on “unseen data,” meaning data that was not included in
the datasets on which the algorithm was trained; an imprecise
algorithm can be easily rooted out if it fails this test.131 However, the
data on which “unseen data” tests are run is commonly taken from
the same source that produced the training set, so any conceptual
problems endemic to the source will be undiscoverable by this form
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of testing.132 Even when the algorithm begins operating in the real
world, it can be challenging to spot the ways in which bias-riddled
concepts prevent the algorithm from producing accurate
evaluations. Since the measurements for accuracy will often be
intertwined with the source of the training data, as is the case with
hiring decisions, algorithmic biases can blend into an already biased
landscape.133 This failure can be exacerbated when the algorithm
operates “online,” retraining on new results affected by its
operation, hence creating “runaway feedback” problems in which
the algorithm becomes progressively inaccurate as it relies on
increasingly biased data.134 As researchers have suggested, such
problems can be characteristic of predictive policing algorithms:
past over-policing can lead to progressively greater over-policing.135
Similar distortions can result from a faulty learning process.
Even when the training set is sufficient and potentially
representative, the learning algorithm can fail to model the training
set in a useful manner. A familiar problem happens when the learner
models the training set too well, “overfitting” the model to the
training data, so that the model is not general enough to be of realworld use.136 Overfitting, endemic to learning methods that create
incredibly intricate models, produces faulty algorithms, not because
the data is inherently under-representative, but instead because the
training process assigns too much weight to irrelevant features in the
training set.137 To reuse the loan example, the mistake of assigning
too much weight to the relative scarcity of minority applicants can
also be described as a matter of overfitting the model to this
132
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incidental feature of the data, factoring in the applicants’
membership in a minority group despite this detail’s irrelevance to
the function the learning process is meant to attain.138 Overfitting
problems can prove to be especially persistent, particularly when it
comes to deep learning methods that operate by locating hidden
patterns embedded in the data.139 As a result, even when an algorithm
is explicitly designed to ignore particular variables, such as
participation in a protected class, deep learning algorithms are prone
to fixate on the “noise” such features leave behind even in their
absence and indirectly weigh them into the model.140
B. Algorithms and Interpretation
Distortions introduced through the use of auxiliary systems also
affect how human decision-makers interpret the meaning of a legal
norm. Several scholars have noted that reliance on algorithms can
affect how decision-makers understand their determinations and the
legal norms that guide those determinations. Ben Green and Yiling
Chen, for instance, note that using risk assessment algorithms can
make decision-makers overemphasize these algorithms’ meaning.141
Even when the algorithm’s predictions are factually accurate, or
especially when they are, reliance on these predictions can increase
the salience of risk in decision-makers’ overall decisions, affecting
how the decision-makers interpret the very meaning of the legal
norm that guides their decisions.142
Cary Coglianese and David Lehr discuss a similar algorithminduced shift toward reliance on quantitative judgments, suggesting
that this transformation can come to represent a substantial change
in the law unaccompanied by political authorization.143 As
Coglianese and Lehr suggest, “the use of algorithms will often
138
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compel agency decision makers to engage in quantitative coding of
value judgments that have typically been made qualitatively.”144
Making this interpretive shift in the meaning of legal norms, as
Coglianese and Lehr note, requires careful deliberation in light of its
profound political effects.145
Richard Re and Alicia Solow-Niederman likewise argue that the
efficiency of algorithmic adjudication can inspire a turn toward
“codified justice,” meaning an interpretation of legal norms that
favors standardization over judicial discretion.146 Machine learning,
Re and Solow-Niederman suggest, introduces a new, correlationbased form of adjudication.147 As this approach takes hold over lay
and professional views of the law, the codified justice that
accompanies this form of adjudication would gradually replace
equitable notions of legal justice, creating a self-reinforcing cycle
that continually pushes toward further codification.
In a similar fashion, Andrew Ferguson notes that reliance on the
products of algorithmic data analysis can lead individuals to trust in
their worst instincts with respect to the facts shaping the norm’s
meaning.148 As discussed above, algorithmic biases can suggest that
minorities are, for instance, more prone to being involved in crime
and less likely to repay loans.149 Even if these erroneous inferences
are taken with a grain of salt, they can nevertheless reaffirm the
human biases that led to the faulty algorithmic reasoning.150
Finally, Frank Pasquale and Glyn Cashwell demonstrate how
machine learning algorithms push toward the emergence of an
impoverished “jurisprudence of behaviorism.”151 As Pasquale and
Cashwell suggest, given how machine learning operates, reliance on
144
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machine learning systems, even in merely auxiliary functions, is
prone to lead decision-makers to overemphasize the place of
measurable data in their interpretation of the applicable norm.152
V. ASSISTIVE SYSTEMS AND LEGAL CHANGE
As suggested above, the effect that auxiliary systems can have
on legal decisions and the meaning of legal norms can be sizable.
Still, Solum and Volokh seem to suggest that this effect does not
amount to the creation of legal meaning, as it does not generate new
norms; these systems only affect how decision-makers implement
and understand existing norms. In the thought experiments Solum
and Volokh offer, the momentous step toward artificially intelligent
legal meaning, with all the scrutiny this step demands, only occurs
when algorithmic systems take over the task of adjudication—
something that Solum and Volokh do not foresee happening in the
near future.153 In contrast, this Part suggests that meaningful
algorithmic takeover can occur as early as the introduction of
assistive machine learning systems—a development already
underway. As will be shown, despite their limitations, these assistive
systems’ ability to emulate rudimentary legal analysis can have a
negative effect on the path of legal development, as use of these
systems can prevent the law’s natural evolution.
A. Assistive Systems
Recent years have seen the rise of systems that advance from
fact-finding and other auxiliary functions to limited legal analysis.
Algorithmic systems have successfully made this transition,
especially when assisting routine and repetitive decisions that take
place within a narrow setting and follow a rule-bound structure.154
These systems’ ability to perform limited legal analysis has

152

Id.
See Solum, supra note 2, at 85; Solum, supra note 3, at 55; Volokh, supra
note 3, at 1137.
154
See Pasquale, supra note 32, at 29; Surden, supra note 35, at 1309.
153

98

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 23: 1

propelled legal algorithms to the assistive stage, directly
participating in the decision-making process.155
Legal algorithms are thus used for advanced legal research, ediscovery, and the evaluation of the strength of legal strategies.156
Other functions increasingly delegated to algorithms include various
triage responsibilities, such as processing, structuring, classifying,
and generally filtering the information provided to decisionmakers.157 Thus, various notice and takedown procedures that
demand responding to large numbers of complaints and targeting
immense amounts of user content, routinely involve widespread
automatic algorithmic decision-making, at least as an initial, often
appealable, step.158
This change is most evident in social media content moderation.
Particularly following the COVID-19 pandemic, platforms have
begun implementing initial algorithmic screening systems to
determine which potentially prohibited content is brought to the
attention of human content moderators.159 In March 2020, YouTube
announced that it was implementing new measures in which
“automated systems will start removing some content without
human review,” detecting “potentially harmful content and then
send[ing] it to human reviewers for assessment.”160 In April of the
155
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same year, Twitter announced its implementation of algorithms
trained on past moderation decisions to “surfac[e] content that’s
most likely to cause harm and should be reviewed first” and
“proactively identify rule-breaking content before it’s reported.”161
Likewise, Facebook has steadily increased its use of proactive
filtering to identify materials that violate its community standards
before these prohibited materials are reported.162 Today, 97.6% of
all hate speech violations on Facebook are proactively detected, with
algorithms independently determining what speech falls under this
classification.163 Similarly, in the first quarter of 2021, YouTube
reported using automated flagging to remove 9,091,315 videos, with
only 478,326 removals originating from human sources.164
Outside of social media content moderation, another area in
which algorithms have switched to legalistic measures of relevance
has been in the prevention of child pornography. In 2018, Google
announced that the company had developed an algorithm capable of
autonomously identifying materials falling under the category of
child pornography, which Google made freely available in the form
of an Application Program Interface (“API”) titled “Content
Safety.”165 Google presents the Content Safety API as a screening
161
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tool to be used before any human evaluation of the material takes
place, thus minimizing human contact with disturbing materials and
scaling up human adjudication.166 Although Google has not
disclosed information on how its algorithm detects child sexual
abuse, the company has suggested that the algorithm does so
through the use of machine learning classifiers.167 In 2021, Pornhub,
responding to mounting public pressure sparked by a 2020 New
York Times piece exposing its facilitation of illegal and exploitative
materials,168 announced its adoption of “Industry-Leading Measures
for Verification, Moderation, and Detection,” to be implemented
across the properties of its parent company, MindGeek, which
controls a significant portion of the online pornography production
market.169 These measures, the pornography colossus announced,
will include proactive screening that involves manual human review
and “a variety of automated detection technologies,” including
Google’s Content Safety API.170
Although this degree of reliance on legalistic filtering is not yet
dominant directly within legal proceedings, there is reason to
believe that it is only a matter of time before algorithmic filtering
expands from the virtual domain to legal decision-making,
especially in routine adjudications where unassisted decisionmaking can result in intolerable backlogs.171 Similarly, a
166
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collaboration between Stanford’s Regulation, Evaluation, and
Governance Lab and Carnegie Mellon’s Language Technologies
Institute is currently developing an algorithmic decision support
system meant to assist the Board of Veterans Appeals in its mass
adjudication of disability and veterans’ benefits determinations.172 In
the most striking example thus far, the Brazilian judiciary is in the
process of implementing machine learning triaging systems to assist
in addressing the country’s immense judicial backlog.173
Legal scholars have responded to these developments by
pointing out that, despite their promise for improving the legal
systems the algorithms aid, these algorithms are also prone to
exacerbating existing problems and introducing new ones.174 Special
attention has been given to the potential opacity of algorithms,175 the
accountability deficit that algorithms can create,176 their contribution
to power inequalities inherent in the legal system,177 the risk of
implicit biases and discriminatory effects,178 their stimulation of
governmental overreach and endangerment of procedural
safeguards,179 and finally, the dehumanizing effect on those
subjected to algorithmic decision-making.180 In contrast, Solum and
Volokh suggest that the legitimacy of such systems mainly hangs on
172
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comparing their capabilities to comparable human agents and, more
importantly, that the legitimacy of such systems only comes into
serious question as algorithms take over the decision-making
process.181
B. Preventing Legal Change
Legal development, however, can be affected not just by the
creation of new norms but also by the prevention of legal change.
This prevention is precisely what is prone to occur as a result of
relying on assistive systems that filter cases brought before legal
decision-makers, limiting them to those cases that accord with
current legal norms.182
As machine learning systems learn to emulate legal analysis, the
systems do so in a very particular manner, eerily similar to Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s description of legal reasoning: the prediction of
how decision-makers would decide on a given case—based on
experience rather than logic.183 Holmes couples this idea with his
famous “bad man’s” view of the law, which suggests that legal
analysis should only be interested in the tangible legal consequences
a rule would have in a specific case.184 However, in bringing up the
bad man’s point of view, Holmes certainly did not mean that law is
an immoral or draconian project—quite the contrary. Holmes meant
that legal decision-makers will be best served by recognizing the
inherent amorality of law’s internal perspective, so that in making
legal decisions, particularly those that involve policy considerations,
legal decision-makers need to be well aware of the need to supplant
the legal perspective with a view focused on the social
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circumstances in which the legal norm operates and the social
purposes the law serves.185
However, given supervised machine learning’s reliance on past
training data to create the normative model that animates the
decision-making algorithm, machine learning algorithms are
inherently incapable of weighing considerations that lie outside of
existing legal paradigms, tethering their future determinations to
past ones. As Tarleton Gillespie puts it, “An effective tool may learn
to make the same kinds of distinctions as before. But while
consistency might sound like a good thing, these policies should
actually adapt over time.”186 For Holmes, in order to ensure that
existing legal paradigms are congruent with the social advantages
the law aims to produce, adjudicators must always keep in mind the
need to adapt law to changing social realities.187 This determination
of the path of the law is not only something adjudicators do while
consciously altering legal precedents or actively creating norms, but
is also an inevitable part of legal adjudication, whether made
explicitly and positively, or negatively through omission; “the result
of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such
considerations is simply to leave the very ground and foundation of
judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious.”188
Likewise, reliance on path-dependent algorithmic systems to
determine which cases are brought before human adjudicators
means that such systems have a negative, hidden effect on legal
development by hindering legal evolution. Although these systems’
reproduction of past legal decisions may appear to leave law
unaffected, their stability in fact has the hidden effect of determining
law’s progress by preventing its development. As Holmes keenly
noted, the choice not to update the norm is as consequential as the
choice to actively alter it, only less forthright.189 Likewise, Robert
Cover famously described positive law as inherently “jurispathic,”
185
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as the choice to keep the law unaltered is the implicit choice to
suppress an alternative legal narrative that could rejuvenate the
law.190 To prevent the law from becoming moribund, healthy legal
development requires the continuous inclusion of “jurisgenerative”
narratives external to the law’s current stance.191 By cementing
dominant legal norms and preventing the inclusion of extralegal
consideration, assistive systems therefore have a considerable, albeit
negative, effect on legal development, as these assistive systems
make it harder for future decisions to substantially divert from past
ones.192
Legal progress is often contingent on realizing that existing legal
categories are incapable of adequately responding to the behaviors
currently outside the law’s purview. The use of supervised machine
learning classifiers generally entails taking the meaning of its
classifications as granted, seeing them as fixed end results with
which to match new cases.193 This appearance of legal immutability
can undercut decision-makers’ ability to appreciate their role in
shaping and updating the meaning of legal norms.194 As social
sentiments change through time, the algorithm’s continued reliance
on past decisions is likely to prevent legal definitions from keeping
up with the times.195
This limitation is reminiscent of, but distinct from, the familiar
problem of “concept drift” or the infamous runaway-feedback
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problem.196 In these two types of malfunctions, a growing mismatch
between the concepts that underlie the training set and the ground
truth the training set purports to represent leads to increasing
inaccuracy in the algorithm’s operation.197 Such distortions,
however, speak to the algorithm’s failure to accurately capture the
meaning of the legal norm. In contrast, the problem here is that the
algorithm is congruent with the relevant legal classification but does
not prevent the classification’s natural development by insulating
the algorithm from societal changes.
VI. PREDICTION AND SUSPICION: THE CASE OF MANDATORY
REPORTING
To demonstrate how reliance on assistive supervised machine
learning systems can produce “artificial legal meaning” even with
contemporary technology, this Article suggests a thought
experiment much like Solum’s and Volokh’s, only much closer to
present day, involving the use of auxiliary and assistive algorithmic
systems to assist legal actors in reporting child maltreatment and
responding to such reports.
The initial part of this thought experiment, namely the creation
of norm-influencing auxiliary systems, is already in place today in
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.198 The thought experiment then
hypothesizes a move to the next stage: using supervised machine
learning systems to assist healthcare professionals who are legally
mandated to report suspected child maltreatment by flagging cases
that involve reportable suspicion. Rather than a hypothetical set in
some future time, sufficiently remote to allow society to calmly
196
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ponder its theoretical meaning, this example illustrates the
immediacy of this discussion. As detailed below, mandatory
reporting is already subject to extensive data collection and analysis
efforts in collaboration between state and federal agencies.
Admittedly, this effort is still far short of amassing the
comprehensive data required for training supervised machine
learning algorithms that could animate assistive systems of the kind
discussed here. Nevertheless, the existing record-keeping efforts,
the willingness and ability to make data accessible for analysis, and
the availability of relatively straightforward evaluation criteria make
it likely that this development is not far off.199
A. Mandatory Reporting
In 2019, the most recent year for which national aggregate data
is publicly available, about 4.4 million suspected child maltreatment
cases were reported to Child Protective Services (“CPS”).200 Of
those reports, about 2.4 million cases met CPS screening criteria,
and the cases of some 3.5 million children were serviced.201
Approximately 656,000 of the children were classified by CPS as
victims of abuse or neglect;202 an estimated 1,840 children died as a
result of reported maltreatment—more than the number of children
who fell to cancer that year.203
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This horrible tally reflects not only a tragic reality but also a
concerted effort to fight the child abuse plague through data
collection and analysis.204 Prodded by the Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act (“CAPTA”), first passed in 1974205 and amended
by the CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010,206 all jurisdictions
today mandate the reporting of suspected child maltreatment to CPS
agencies.207 Referrals to CPS are either “screened in”—where
“reports” are created and the agency responds in some way—or
“screened out” because the referrals either fail to meet CPS
reporting criteria, are lacking in information, or are outside the
jurisdiction of CPS.208 In 1988, CAPTA was amended to direct the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to create a national data
collection and analysis program; this directive led to the
establishment of the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System
(“NCANDS”).209 States voluntarily submit records of reported cases
to the NCANDS, including completed reports and their findings.210
CPS reports are supplemented by agency files containing aggregate
data from agencies outside of CPS.211 The collected data are
analyzed and put into annual reports by the Children’s Bureau in the
Administration on Children, Youth and Families.212 In addition, the
National Data Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect was established
in 1988 to house this data along with data from individual

204
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researchers, prepare the data for research, and disseminate the
prepared data to qualified researchers.213
The duty to report child maltreatment is today a familiar fixture
of the legal landscape. First applicable to physicians, and later
expanded to all healthcare professionals, the duty to report attaches
to as many as forty professions that routinely come into contact with
children or are otherwise likely to encounter information indicative
of maltreatment, at times explicitly tied to the reporter’s professional
role.214 Who exactly is obligated to report varies from state to state.215
Physicians remain prominent in the reporting process, specified as
mandatory reporters in forty-seven jurisdictions,216 and often assess
the medical significance of findings reported by others.217 Other
professions notably include social workers, educators, therapists,
childcare providers, law enforcement officers, film and photograph
processors, and computer technicians.218 In approximately eighteen
jurisdictions, any person who suspects child maltreatment is
required to submit a report, in most cases supplementing
professional obligations.219 In 2019, various professionals submitted
68.6% of screened-in reports, of which, healthcare and mental health
professionals were responsible for 17%.220
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The definition of maltreatment has expanded over time, and
states differ in regard to what must be reported.221 CAPTA defines
“child abuse and neglect” as “at a minimum, any recent act or failure
to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death,
serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or
an act or failure to act which presents an imminent risk of serious
harm.”222 While some state statutes explicitly enunciate what falls
under these categories, statutes and regulations often seek to define
maltreatment in broad terms in an effort to encourage reporting—
although not all jurisdictions agree that this broad definition is a
constructive approach, fearing that doing so could overburden CPS
and needlessly create animosity between families and reporters.223
B. Auxiliary Reporting Systems
To aid CPS in responding to the massive number of complaints
they receive, several jurisdictions have begun implementing
algorithmic systems to assist screeners in determining the urgency
of the complaint.224 Although CPS decisions are contingent on
referrals from reporters, it is often up to CPS—or other law
enforcement agencies—to determine whether a case justifies state

221

See e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILD.’S BUREAU, CHILD
WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, WHAT IS CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT? RECOGNIZING
THE SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS 2 (2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/
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involvement.225 In an attempt to balance the terrible risks of underinvolvement and the costs of over-involvement, risk-prediction
algorithms are increasingly employed to assist CPS in making these
decisions.226 Such systems use as input data various indicators that
are presumably predictive of maltreatment to track an outcome
variable translated to a risk predictor.227 Of particular note is the
Allegheny Family Screening Tool (“AFST”), implemented by the
Department of Human Services in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,
in 2016.228 The system uses information provided in the referral
combined with additional information found in child welfare
information systems to assign a risk score to the referral as a
supplement to the human screener’s evaluation.229
Although these systems are “merely” assessment tools meant to
assist human screeners in evaluating the (factual) risk involved in
complaints they receive, Erin Dalton, the leader of Allegheny
County’s data-analysis department, was not shy about the system’s
more ambitious goal, telling the New York Times that the system
also aims to “change the mind-set of the screeners . . . . It’s a very
strong, dug-in culture. They want to focus on the immediate
allegation, not the child’s future risk a year or two down the line.
They call it clinical decision-making. I call it someone’s opinion.”230
Indeed, as discussion on similar uses of auxiliary fact-finding
systems illustrates, the system’s design can significantly influence
how human decision-makers implement and understand the law. As
Virginia Eubanks illustrates, “the model is already subtly changing
225
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how some intake screeners do their jobs.”231 As the system enjoys an
aura of scientific objectivity, human screeners increasingly defer to
the algorithm’s judgment when it conflicts with the screener’s
judgment.232 The algorithm, however, is reliant on past data, making
it susceptible to familiar biases.233 One such bias, Eubanks suggests,
results from the increased exposure of lower-income families to the
kind of data collected by state authorities and analyzed by the
algorithm.234 As a result, screeners’ exercise of their legal roles, and
their subsequent understanding of these roles, is shaped by the
design choices that produced the algorithmic predictions, creating a
likewise biased legal notion of risk.235
C. The Need for Algorithmic Assistance
Moving from auxiliary algorithms aiding screeners to assistive
systems aiding mandated reports involves a change from factual,
forward-facing assessment of risk to backward-looking legal
analysis of the meaning of the suspected behavior.236 Admittedly, the
normative space between reporter and screener is sometimes
minimal or nonexistent. Severe maltreatment cases clearly need to
be reported and screened in by CPS. In borderline cases, though, the
medical, legal, and protective questions can diverge. There are
instances in which an injury is likely nonaccidental yet does not
mandate reporting from a legal point of view, either because the
harm is not “serious” or because the facts do not meet the threshold
of reasonable suspicion.237 Likewise, given the forward-facing
nature of CPS services, there are cases in which reportable
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maltreatment does not justify protective intervention—the extreme
case being the intentional killing of a child with no siblings.238
Assisting mandated reporters will therefore require a tool
different from the one in use today—one that will help reporters
make the medical determination concerning the injury’s diagnosis
and etiology as well as determine whether the circumstances
mandate reporting under the law. The latter, as with any reasonable
suspicion determination, requires a totality-of-the-circumstances
approach that takes into account both medical considerations and the
other considerations that go into CPS decisions.239 Such systems will
require machine learning algorithms capable of developing a model
of “reportable suspicion” to accordingly classify new cases.
The ability to create such algorithms is inseparable from the
urgent need that demands their creation. Today, the work of
mandated reporters increasingly takes place in a world of big data,
with every decision potentially informed by vast amounts of
pertinent information. Even when suspicion results from a “small
data” setting—e.g., a single visit to the doctor’s office—the services
rendered will often be assisted by machine learning algorithms that
are the products of big data.240 In this reality, the introduction of
algorithmic systems to assist reporters seems to be merely a matter
of time. Without algorithmic assistance, the breadth of data that can
give rise to reportable suspicion can become so massive as to be
unmanageable.241 Medical histories can be used by trained
professionals to routinely locate suspected abuse; however, going
through a decade’s worth of case histories in a large hospital in
238
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240
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search of suspicious patterns would, even if it were humanly
possible, undoubtedly be so time-consuming as to be impractical.242
Big data also opens the door to including previously untapped
data sources that may shed additional light on a single decision, from
statewide Child Welfare Information Systems to other public and
commercial databases.243 Again, consulting this precious
information will require algorithmic assistance. Finally, big data can
be used to train algorithms that can take over routine administrative
and even clinical functions. As algorithms become better at
emulating human healthcare professionals’ work, algorithms offer
increasingly appealing applications for handling stored information
by analyzing and structuring patient data, so that the analyzed data
are presented to physicians in a way that best meets their
professional needs.244 With such algorithms in use, information
needed to form suspicion of maltreatment could be hidden away
from mandated reporters, unless the assistive systems are explicitly
designed to flag that information.
As medical diagnosis increasingly operates in a big data
environment, the scattered information on which medical reporters
often rely in determining whether a case is reportable gets placed
behind a veil that can only be pierced by enlisting the help of
machine learning systems. No doubt, using machine learning in this
context can be a perilous quantum leap. The case may be, as Frank
Pasquale and Glyn Cashwell write, that the efficiency machine
learning offers cannot, in and of itself, justify the significant
jurisprudential risks machine learning creates.245 However, in the
categories discussed above, a real risk exists that, without using
machine learning, the duty to report will fall into desuetude—
reporting will become delayed to the point that the purpose of
reporting is effectively denied.246 This consequence is already
becoming a reality in other legal domains, and it seems safe to
242
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assume that given the grave implications of unreported suspicions,
mandatory reporting will soon follow suit.247
Furthermore, medical and other “algorithmic professionals” are
rapidly becoming a reality, providing users with services that have
little to no human involvement.248 In a remarkable development,
Google, for instance, has recently announced the anticipated launch
of an AI-powered dermatology tool meant to provide medical
diagnosis of common skin conditions.249 Naturally, such services
would be particularly appealing to those who wish to keep
suspicious information away from mandated reporters. Although
such information may be divulged with the intention of concealment
from human view, failing to expand the duty to report to include
such cases—meaning, requiring that such algorithms report their
suspicions to their human counterparts—would significantly
diminish the scope of the duty.250
D. Assistive Reporting Systems
Recognizing this need, in the proposed thought experiment, a
supervised machine learning system is introduced to assist medical
professionals in exercising their reporting duties by flagging cases
that may involve reportable suspicion. The discussion is limited to
the handling of information voluntarily provided, albeit for medical
reasons, and ignores the potential proactive use of algorithms to
detect suspected abuse in other sources. The discussion is further
limited to algorithms used at most to flag and triage suspected abuse
cases so that suspected abuse can be brought to the attention of
human mandated reporters. This limitation should not be inferred as
247
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suggesting that algorithms cannot or should not be used as
independent reporters, or even as adjudicators, enforcers, or
legislators—questions that have already invoked some scholarly
debate.251 Rather, this Article seeks to demonstrate that these
algorithmic systems can effectively create legal meaning, even
when the algorithm is used in a purely assistive function. For this
reason, this thought experiment also assumes that the human
decision is made de novo, disregarding the fact that the algorithm
found reasonable suspicion.252
In the thought experiment, the supervised machine learning
algorithm used to make these determinations would be trained on
datasets comprising past case histories labeled according to whether
the cases were reported or not. For the sake of argument, the
experiment assumes that these past determinations have left copious
information about the circumstances in which the decisions were
made, including both pertinent and irrelevant information,
information gathered from medical history files, legal proceedings,
and any other available sources.
For the purpose of the discussion, the thought experiment
assumes that the output variable is tethered to the classification of
the facts of the case as mandating reporting, mapped on previous
reporting decisions. This decision is not obvious but is the decision
that would most reasonably be made. Already as has become evident
in the case of the AFST, no clear indicator of actual maltreatment is
readily available, making AFST rely instead on measuring rereferral of screened-out cases and placement of children in foster
care as proxies for actual maltreatment.253 Likewise, one could
suggest that the right decision to model—meaning to use as the
outcome variable—should be the CPS screening decision, with the
intention of creating an algorithm that helps close the gap between
reporting and screening in. However, as discussed above, doing so
will unnecessarily eliminate the vital distinction between mandated
251
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reporters’ independent function and that of CPS.254 Closing the gap
between reporting and screening in would necessarily leave out
cases of reportable maltreatment that do not fall within CPS’s
reporting criteria;255 even though such cases would not lead to legal
ramifications, reporting can nonetheless have critical social
purposes. An appropriate model for reporting purposes will have to
make explicit this distinction, as an expression of the distinct
normative function of mandated reporters.256
However, choosing past reporting as the training process’ output
variable would entail that the system’s decision of whether to bring
any new case to the reporter’s attention is tethered to the preexisting
legal meaning of “reportable suspicion.” No matter how
multifaceted the input data that the algorithm weighs to make this
determination is, any datapoint would only be appraised in light of
its ability to affect the legal meaning of reporting, as this legal
category existed at the time the training sets were created. Even
though final reporting decisions would remain in human hands, what
human decision-makers decide upon and see in making these
decisions would be determined according to its relevance to past
legal meaning.257
Healthcare professionals would likely be highly susceptible to
this winnowing effect. The algorithm’s success in correctly
implementing the strict meaning of “reportable suspicion” is likely
to cause these mandated reporters to at most question the
algorithm’s accuracy but not the basic premises of its operational
model and especially not the legalistic output classification that
drives it—meaning the determination of whether a case falls under
254
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the preexisting category of “reportable suspicion.”258 Healthcare
professionals, and mandated reporters more generally, are typically
not trained lawyers; although different mandated reporters often
participate in dedicated training to help those professionals
determine what constitutes reportable suspicion, adequately trained
legal algorithms theoretically could offer expert-level advice—far
surpassing the minimal training reporters currently receive.259
Reporting duties ensnare reporters in a complicated web of
conflicting and ill-defined legal obligations.260 As lay legal
classifiers, mandated reporters are prone to relying on moral
intuition and nonlegal considerations to make the legal portion of
their decision,261 but the algorithm’s reasoning would more closely
track liability rules and considerations shaped by legal findings on
file and assisted by the legal expertise injected into the training
process.262 Furthermore, the holistic approach that is the hallmark of
machine learning could more closely follow the totality-of-thecircumstances standard and the need to consider unintuitive
exculpating evidence.263
For these reasons, the use of machine learning to assist in the
legal classification of reportable suspicion will likely become highly
influential in shaping best practices, thereby helping to shield
reporters from liability.264 Even beyond liability considerations, the
duty to report frequently introduces an unwelcome conflict between
healthcare professionals and their patients or clients; there is good
reason to believe that reliance on algorithmic decision-making could
258
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be used to alleviate some of this tension by sharing the burden of
reporting with the algorithm, even if the ultimate decision remains
in human hands.265
The system’s constriction of reporting decisions seems even
more likely given the dualistic nature of mandatory reporting.
Mandated reporters are commonly not law enforcement
professionals tasked with locating and investigating suspected
abuse;266 rather, most mandated reporters are professionals whose
lines of work make them likely to come into contact with incidental
information that could form the basis for suspicion. While at times
reporters are explicitly notified of the child’s maltreatment,
reportable suspicion is often based on indicators found in
information not directly related to the reason for which the
information was provided: the behavior of a patient or a family
member,267 a pattern of otherwise unrelated traumatic episodes, or a
host of other indicators that trained medical professionals come to
identify as suspicious.268 Even when the information’s legal
significance is of little doubt, locating the information will often
require inferences and probabilistic assessment, leaving much room
for the algorithm’s discretion—which the algorithm will exercise
based mainly on the legalistic definition the algorithm drew from its
experience with the training set.269 As the human decision-maker’s
sole source of information, these legalistic definitions will serve as
the basis for the human decision, likewise limiting decision-making
to established legal categories.270 As algorithms become increasingly
responsible for determining what information is brought before
reporters, fewer such incidental details, irrelevant to the reporter’s
265
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main professional function, will come out into the open—unless an
algorithm is designed to locate them.
E. Creating the Legal Meaning of Maltreatment
In the above thought experiment, the result of using an assistive
system to make medical professionals aware of cases that fall under
the legal category of reportable suspicion is that medical
professionals only encounter “incidental” information—of the kind
that can produce reportable suspicion—when these details are
deemed relevant to the preexisting meaning of this legal category.
The result of such constriction is the tethering of any future legal
meaning reporters produce to the meaning that informed past
decisions. The more that healthcare professionals’ encounters with
potential maltreatment are contingent on previous algorithmic
classifications, the less these professionals become aware of forms
of maltreatment that do not fall under this formal category.271
“Reportable maltreatment,” however, is hardly a static notion;
preventing its congruence with changing norms is no less
consequential in its creation of legal meaning than positive
adaptation. The definition of reportable maltreatment is an unsettled
amalgamation of fact and law, leading some to view the definition
as “inherently problematic and variable.”272 Physical abuse is most
commonly understood to mean serious nonaccidental harm to a
child by a person responsible for the child; the definition does not
include physical disciplining, as long as the disciplining is
reasonable and causes no bodily injury.273 As Virginia Eubanks
notes, this definition, even with the requirement that harm be
“serious,” still leaves much room for subjectivity on what
constitutes maltreatment.274 For example, “Is spanking abusive? Or
271
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is the line drawn at striking a child with a closed hand? Is letting
your children walk to a park down the block alone neglectful? Even
if you can see them from the window?”275 As Brett Drake further
illustrates, the legal facet of the definition necessarily assumes that
some intentional and non-disciplinary harm will not be regarded as
maltreatment, either because the harm lacks probative value or
because the harm is insufficiently injurious: “A parent may state
openly that he or she has caused a given injury, but if that harm was
sufficiently minor, the [mandated reporter] may be unable to
substantiate physical abuse.”276
Similar indeterminacy surrounds the question of when a report
must be made—a matter that is of particular import to healthcare
professionals.277 Although state statutes differ in their wording, most
statutes establish that the duty to report does not require the reporter
to have knowledge of maltreatment; instead, it is enough that the
reporter possess reasonable suspicion.278 The reasonable suspicion
standard indicates that reporting requires less than a firm belief but
more than the mere possibility that the observed injuries resulted
from maltreatment.279 With little more than this vague definition to
rely upon, reasonable suspicion has often been condemned as
hopelessly indeterminate to the point of unconstitutionality.280 As a
result, the scope of the duty to report is extremely contextsensitive,281 with studies showing that reporters radically differ in
their understanding of reportable suspicion.282 These studies found
that such decisions are as informed by tacit professional intuition as
275
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such decisions are attributable to general principles.283 This result is
commonly seen as an unsatisfactory situation. Aligning with this
viewpoint, Benjamin Levi and Sharon Portwood have argued that,
“If reasonable suspicion is to entail more than the ‘mere possibility’
that a child was abused[,] . . . potential reporters need guidance on
how likely abuse must be before reporting is required”—guidance
that Levi and Portwood believe is found neither in available legal
advice nor in CPS guidance.284
Levi and Portwood’s arguments suggest that the meaning of
reportable suspicion is continually evolving—shaped not just by its
factual implementation and interpretation in specific cases, but also
by the changing meaning of “seriousness” and the acceptability of
physical disciplining, both concepts introduced into the legal
meaning of reportable suspicion through reporters’ decisions. As
these decisions become reliant on the assistance of algorithmic
systems and are constricted by their regressive legal analysis, these
systems effectively create their own static version of maltreatment,
superimposing their definition over the legal norm.
Even though the systems assisting mandated reporters in this
hypothetical would not be creating original norms, the systems
would nonetheless be determining the legal meaning of reportable
suspicion by deciding whether reportable suspicion applies in given
cases—shaping how reporters understand reportable suspicion—
and, ultimately, by preventing the natural evolution of legal
elements, such as acceptable physical disciplining. In preventing the
law’s development, algorithms will essentially be functioning as
Holmes’s inert judges, charting the path of the law by omission.
Although this development seems less dramatic than the emergence
of active norm-generation by algorithms, the jurisprudential
concerns this development raises as to algorithms’ legitimacy are no
less troubling.
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VII. CONCLUSION
By examining the hypothetical cases of an algorithmic system
meant to assist mandated reporters in determining which cases
require reporting of child maltreatment, this Article seeks to
demonstrate the dangers of delaying normative deliberation over the
legitimacy of using law-making algorithms to the time in which
these systems are capable of replacing human adjudicators. As this
hypothetical case demonstrates, focus on the moment of
replacement hides the negative effect that reliance on assistive legal
analyses is prone to have on the law’s natural development. This
effect, as this Article suggests, can amount to the “jurispathic”
creation of legal meaning by constricting legal decision-makers’
worldviews in a way that insulates these decision-makers from
social changes and prevents the adoption of alternative legal
narratives. Although less visible than the positive creation of new
norms by autonomous decision-making systems, this effect is just as
consequential, and unlike positive algorithmic law-making, this
effect is just around the corner. Addressing this challenge will
require not only understanding the inherent limits of machine
learning but also seeing how legal decisions must be free—to some
extent—from the constrictions of past decisions as decision-makers
chart the future path of the law.

